Contents
MITRE ATT&CK coverage — 8 techniques across 4 tactics
| Tactic / Technique | Name | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| Stealth / T1036.005 | Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location | Process Named svchost.exe Running From an AppData Path With a Parent Outside System32 and SysWOW64 (SIGMA, Hunting) |
| Stealth / T1497 | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion | KAIDO Anti-Analysis Sleep Obfuscation Debug String With Family Namespace (YARA, Detection) |
| Defense Impairment / T1553.005 | Mark-of-the-Web Bypass | Zone.Identifier ADS Deletion by a Process Outside System32 and Defender Paths (MOTW Bypass) (SIGMA, Hunting) |
| Collection / T1113 | Screen Capture | KAIDO HVNC DXGI Named-Pipe Transport (YARA, Detection); KAIDO HVNC DXGI Named-Pipe Creation (SIGMA, Hunting) |
| Command and Control / T1071.001 | Web Protocols | KAIDO TeamKAIDO C2 TLS Certificate Issuer (SURICATA, Detection) |
| Command and Control / T1095 | Non-Application Layer Protocol | Outbound TCP Payload to Port 4782 (Quasar Default Port, KAIDO C2 Port) (SURICATA, Hunting) |
| Command and Control / T1219 | Remote Access Tools | KAIDO Quasar-Fork Namespace + Costura Asset (YARA, Detection); KAIDO HVNC DXGI Named-Pipe Transport (YARA, Detection); KAIDO HVNC DXGI Named-Pipe Creation (SIGMA, Hunting) |
| Command and Control / T1573.001 | Symmetric Cryptography | KAIDO TeamKAIDO C2 TLS Certificate Issuer (SURICATA, Detection) |
Campaign: KAIDO-EvilSoul-Engine-MaaS-144[.]172[.]103[.]98
Date: 2026-07-03
Author: The Hunters Ledger
License: CC BY 4.0
Reference: https://the-hunters-ledger.com/reports/kaido-quasar-rat-144-172-109-203/
Detection Coverage Summary
Scope note: this file covers only the KAIDO Quasar-fork RAT product line (PART A of the parent investigation). The EvilSoul-Engine stealer-builder line is covered in a separate detection file. No rules are duplicated here.
KAIDO is a rebranded 64-bit fork of the open-source Quasar RAT carrying an HVNC (Hidden-VNC) module that clones the victim’s entire browser profile and drives their already-authenticated session on a hidden desktop.
| Rule Type | Detection | Hunting | MITRE Techniques Covered | Atomics → feed |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| YARA | 3 | 0 | T1219, T1113, T1497 | 0 |
| Sigma | 0 | 3 | T1553.005, T1219, T1113, T1036.005 | 0 |
| Suricata | 1 | 1 | T1071.001, T1573.001, T1095 | 1 |
Detection vs Hunting: Detection rules are high-fidelity and evasion-resilient, safe to alert on. Hunting rules are broader, for scoping and threat-hunting. Expect to review the hits.
Highest-confidence anchors:
- Namespace root
Kaido.Common.Messagesand Costura assetcostura.kaido.common.dll, survive obfuscation, near-zero FP (YARA Detection). - Raw TCP/4782 Quasar binary protocol +
TeamKAIDO/kaido-c2TLS certificate issuer + JA4Xbbd6cc0fca29_bbd6cc0fca29_795797892f9c, fleet-enumeration-grade (Suricata Detection).
Atomics routed to the IOC feed: the primary C2 domain kaidoo[.]com[.]br (and its c2./www. siblings) is a transient indicator. It lives in kaido-quasar-rat-iocs.json rather than as a standalone DNS signature (removing the domain leaves nothing to detect). Block it via the feed.
Coverage note on HVNC runtime behavior: the HVNC module (hidden-desktop creation, browser-profile clone, DXGI capture) is fully recovered from static analysis (DEFINITE/HIGH), but the malware is C2-gated and withholds all post-connection behavior (persistence, HVNC activation, credential collection) until a valid Quasar handshake completes (T1480). Behavioral rules for the named-pipe transport and install path are written from static/structural evidence; see Coverage Gaps for what would raise the HVNC-specific rules to DEFINITE.
YARA Rules
Detection Rules
KAIDO Quasar-Fork Namespace + Costura Asset
Tier: Detection
Robustness: 2
ATT&CK Coverage: T1219 (Remote Access Software)
Confidence: HIGH
Rationale: Logic fix 2026-10-11: the heading and description require a namespace and a Costura asset, but the condition was 2 of ($ns1, $ns2, $cost, $desk), so the second namespace string and the Default_runhost literal satisfied it with no Costura asset. It is now the Costura asset name plus one of the two namespace strings; the HVNC hidden-desktop literal was dropped from the rule. A fixture with $ns2 and Default_runhost only matched the old rule and does not match the new one. Kaido.Common.Messages is the namespace root of the rebranded Quasar fork and survives the sample’s obfuscation pass intact (no literal Quasar string remains); paired with the Costura-embedded asset name, this combination is specific to this build lineage in the samples examined. Round 2 (2026-10-11): the earlier text said the operator cannot rename it without re-architecting the codebase, which the Blind Spots below contradict (a rebrand of the Kaido.* namespaces and the asset name evades the rule); the identifiers are operator-chosen strings and the rule is durable only until a rebuild renames them. Either of the two namespace strings, with the asset name, matches; the Kaido.Common.Messages root is not required by itself.
False Positives: None known — Kaido.Common.Messages and costura.kaido.common.dll are distinctive compiled identifiers not present in legitimate .NET software; fullword further reduces substring-collision risk.
Blind Spots: A full rebrand that renames the Kaido.* namespace root would evade this rule; a memory-only variant that never lands on disk is not covered by a live process-memory scan, because the filesize test cannot match there (a saved dump written to a file can be scanned).
Validation: Scan a KAIDO sample (e.g. hash1 below) — the namespace + Costura asset must match; a benign Costura-packed .NET application must NOT fire. A file with the asset name and only the HVNC helper namespace also fires.
Deployment: Endpoint AV/EDR file scan, scanning of saved dumps of svchost.exe-masquerading processes, static triage of unknown MSIL binaries. Live process-memory scanning does not match: the condition’s filesize test is undefined there, so only files and saved dumps are scanned.
/*
Yara Rule Set
Identifier: KAIDO Quasar-Fork RAT
Author: The Hunters Ledger
Source: https://the-hunters-ledger.com/
License: CC BY 4.0 - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
*/
rule RAT_KAIDO_Quasar_Fork_Namespace {
meta:
description = "Detects the KAIDO Quasar-fork RAT in a PE under 5 MB that contains the Costura-embedded asset name costura.kaido.common.dll plus one of two namespace strings, Kaido.Common.Messages or Kaido.Client.Helper.HVNC.ProcessController. Either namespace string suffices, so the Kaido.Common.Messages root is not required by itself. The report says these identifiers survive the sample's obfuscation pass"
license = "CC BY 4.0 - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"
author = "The Hunters Ledger"
reference = "https://the-hunters-ledger.com/hunting-detections/kaido-quasar-rat-detections/"
date = "2026-07-03"
modified = "2026-10-11"
hash1 = "c7542e8265f70d6c1dbf2e3cf6e81a90198cd157d3d6693c6d2a8a49d99a5b8d"
hash2 = "928f2ffa7fc84b74941fb714455d7bc14847b3af"
hash3 = "20989b06f7c670ab973da6609855bcf9"
family = "KAIDO"
malware_type = "RAT"
campaign = "KAIDO-EvilSoul-Engine-MaaS-144.172.103.98"
id = "3c4d70e9-aaaf-50e7-b58b-a4b3595386e9"
strings:
$ns1 = "Kaido.Common.Messages" ascii wide fullword
$ns2 = "Kaido.Client.Helper.HVNC.ProcessController" ascii wide
$cost = "costura.kaido.common.dll" ascii wide nocase
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and
filesize < 5MB and
$cost and 1 of ($ns1, $ns2)
}
KAIDO HVNC DXGI Named-Pipe Transport
Tier: Detection
Robustness: 3
ATT&CK Coverage: T1219 (Remote Access Software), T1113 (Screen Capture — MODERATE, static-only)
Confidence: HIGH
Rationale: The DXGI-hook HVNC frame transport uses a distinctive pipe-name prefix, environment variable, frame magic value, and reader and capture-loop thread names, and the browser-clone code adds a log message — none generic Windows or .NET runtime terms. The rule requires two of the five strings (the pipe prefix, the environment variable, the two thread names and the BrowserClone message count equally toward the two), or the frame magic together with the pipe prefix or the environment variable, so no single renameable literal carries it.
False Positives: None known — KAIDO_DXGI_PIPE, kaido_dxgi_, and the paired thread names are family-specific compiled strings; the hex frame magic fires only together with the pipe prefix or the environment variable, never alone.
Blind Spots: Misses a build in which fewer than two of the five strings survive and the frame magic is not paired with the pipe prefix or the environment variable. Renaming the pipe prefix, the environment variable and the two thread names is enough on its own, because the BrowserClone message is then a single string and the frame magic alone does not match. The DXGI capture path only exists in builds carrying the HVNC module.
Validation: Scan a KAIDO HVNC-capable sample — at least two of the five strings (pipe prefix, environment variable, the two thread names, the BrowserClone message), or the frame magic with the pipe prefix or the environment variable, must match; a benign screen-capture or remote-desktop tool must NOT fire.
Deployment: Endpoint AV/EDR file scan, scanning of saved dumps taken during suspected HVNC activity. Live process-memory scanning does not match: the condition’s filesize test is undefined there, so only files and saved dumps are scanned.
rule RAT_KAIDO_HVNC_DXGI_Pipe {
meta:
description = "Detects the KAIDO RAT HVNC module via its DXGI-hook named-pipe transport strings (pipe prefix, env var, frame magic, reader and capture-loop thread names) and the BrowserClone log message; two of the five strings, or the frame magic with the pipe prefix or env var, are required"
license = "CC BY 4.0 - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"
author = "The Hunters Ledger"
reference = "https://the-hunters-ledger.com/hunting-detections/kaido-quasar-rat-detections/"
date = "2026-07-03"
hash1 = "385d20ca574976e3ba3f4f3079420f8a1c3935c0ab4a3f87063beea27d41e254"
hash2 = ""
hash3 = ""
family = "KAIDO"
malware_type = "RAT"
campaign = "KAIDO-EvilSoul-Engine-MaaS-144.172.103.98"
id = "eb4ef7d6-e3f0-5eea-8211-654d9ccff6fa"
strings:
$pipe = "kaido_dxgi_" ascii wide nocase
$envvar = "KAIDO_DXGI_PIPE" ascii wide fullword
$rdr = "DXGI FrameReader" ascii wide
$fbk = "HVNC Capture Loop" ascii wide
$clone = "[BrowserClone] Using handle hijacking for locked files..." ascii wide
$magic = { 4B 81 3F 44 }
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and
filesize < 5MB and
(2 of ($pipe, $envvar, $rdr, $fbk, $clone) or ($magic and 1 of ($pipe, $envvar)))
}
KAIDO Anti-Analysis Sleep Obfuscation Debug String With Family Namespace
Tier: Detection
Robustness: 2
ATT&CK Coverage: T1497 (Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion)
ATT&CK Note: The report maps the build’s AES-256-GCM configuration and wire encryption to T1573.001. This rule tests no cryptographic string or framing pattern (only the [ANTI] debug string and the family namespace), so it does not cover that technique.
Confidence: MODERATE
Rationale: The developer-left anti-analysis debug string is distinctive but stands alone as a single string; the rule pairs it with the family namespace so both must be present. A secondary/corroborating anchor — the debug string could be stripped from a cleaned build, hence Robustness 2 rather than 3.
False Positives: None known — the debug string is family-specific and the rule requires it and the Kaido.Common.Messages namespace string.
Blind Spots: A release build that removes the developer debug string evades this rule (the namespace rule above still fires). The rule contains no cryptography test of any kind; an earlier heading named a config crypto framing that the condition never implemented.
Validation: Scan a KAIDO sample carrying the [ANTI] debug string — must match; a benign .NET binary without the [ANTI] string or the Kaido.Common.Messages namespace must NOT fire.
Deployment: Endpoint AV/EDR file scan; secondary/corroborating rule, not primary detection.
rule RAT_KAIDO_AntiAnalysis_SleepObfuscation {
meta:
description = "Detects the KAIDO RAT via its developer-left anti-analysis debug string referencing sleep obfuscation with mutex and stack detection, used to evade sandbox timing-based detonation checks"
license = "CC BY 4.0 - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"
author = "The Hunters Ledger"
reference = "https://the-hunters-ledger.com/hunting-detections/kaido-quasar-rat-detections/"
date = "2026-07-03"
hash1 = "022944768c4326d611fa3edb100eb8277228717a220580e7ffce143341aa39fa"
hash2 = ""
hash3 = ""
family = "KAIDO"
malware_type = "RAT"
campaign = "KAIDO-EvilSoul-Engine-MaaS-144.172.103.98"
id = "683cd96b-bebc-5bcc-8d4c-3aa380acd5d6"
strings:
$anti = "[ANTI] Sleep obfuscation ENABLED (fixed: mutex + stack detection + 32MB cap)" ascii wide
$ns = "Kaido.Common.Messages" ascii wide fullword
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and
filesize < 5MB and
$anti and $ns
}
Sigma Rules
Hunting Rules
Zone.Identifier ADS Deletion by a Process Outside System32 and Defender Paths (MOTW Bypass)
Tier: Hunting
Robustness: 2
ATT&CK Coverage: T1553.005 (Mark-of-the-Web Bypass)
Confidence: HIGH (behavior) / triage required (attribution)
Rationale: The malware reads then deletes its own Zone.Identifier alternate data stream shortly after launch (the report records this at T+2.4s in a behavioral run), a MOTW bypass. The rule matches the deletion of any such stream by any process outside the two filter paths; it has no test for the deleting process being the deleted file’s own image and no KAIDO indicator, so a hit is a MOTW-clearing lead and not an attribution. Anchored on the deletion event (category: file_delete) rather than file creation — a plain :Zone.Identifier file-event selector would match every downloaded file (the ADS is created on every download) and is pure baseline noise. Scoping to deletion turns it into a genuine Hunting lead for MOTW-clearing behavior, but self-updating software also clears its own MOTW, so an analyst triages the hits.
False Positives:
- Self-updating legitimate software (browsers, some installers) that clears its own Zone.Identifier stream after a user-consented first run.
- Administrative scripts that bulk-clear MOTW on downloaded files.
Blind Spots: Needs file-delete telemetry that reports alternate data streams; where the sensor does not, the rule never fires. A process that clears the stream from inside System32 or the Defender folder is excluded.
Deployment: Endpoint EDR / Sysmon-fed SIEM (FileDelete telemetry), correlated with process creation for the same image.
title: Zone.Identifier Alternate Data Stream Deletion by a Process Outside System32 and Defender Paths
id: d428415f-5926-466a-abcb-5cb91be4d187
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a file-delete event for a Zone.Identifier alternate data
stream by a process whose image path is outside System32 and the
Defender program folder. The KAIDO Quasar-fork RAT does this to its own
stream shortly after launch, a Mark-of-the-Web bypass that suppresses
SmartScreen re-checks on later executions. The rule does not test that
the deleting process is the file the stream belonged to, and nothing in
it identifies KAIDO. Anchored on the file-delete event rather than file
creation to avoid matching every downloaded file.
references:
- https://the-hunters-ledger.com/hunting-detections/kaido-quasar-rat-detections/
author: The Hunters Ledger
date: 2026-07-03
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1553.005
- detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
category: file_delete
product: windows
definition: 'Requires Sysmon file-delete events (EID 23 FileDelete or EID 26 FileDeleteDetected). Whether a deleted alternate data stream is reported as a TargetFilename ending in :Zone.Identifier depends on the Sysmon build and configuration and was not tested here.'
detection:
selection:
TargetFilename|endswith: ':Zone.Identifier'
filter_legit_installer: # sourced: Windows and Defender platform components, assumed to be the legitimate Zone.Identifier handlers; not confirmed against a captured event
Image|contains:
- '\Windows\System32\'
- '\Program Files\Windows Defender\'
condition: selection and not filter_legit_installer
falsepositives:
- >-
Self-updating legitimate software (browsers, some installers) that
clears its own Zone.Identifier stream after a user-consented first run
- Administrative scripts that bulk-clear MOTW on downloaded files
level: medium
KAIDO HVNC DXGI Named-Pipe Creation
Tier: Hunting
Robustness: 1
ATT&CK Coverage: T1219 (Remote Access Software), T1113 (Screen Capture — static/structural evidence)
Confidence: HIGH (structural anchor); underlying HVNC runtime behavior itself MODERATE (C2-gated, not dynamically triggered)
Rationale: The kaido_dxgi_ named-pipe prefix is a family-specific transport artifact with no known legitimate collision, so today’s FP is near-zero — but it is a single operator-chosen literal that a rebuild renames trivially. Durability governs over as-written precision, so this is a Hunting anchor, not a Detection one. The YARA HVNC rule (which requires a multi-string combination) carries the Detection-grade coverage for the same capability.
False Positives: Unlikely — the kaido_dxgi_ pipe-name prefix has not been observed in any legitimate Windows or third-party software to date.
Deployment: Endpoint EDR with named-pipe telemetry (Sysmon Event ID 17/18).
title: KAIDO RAT HVNC DXGI Named-Pipe Creation
id: 6fadc50c-a64b-4120-b02e-f22516b0c815
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects creation of a named pipe matching the kaido_dxgi_ prefix used
by the KAIDO Quasar-fork RAT's HVNC module to stream DXGI-captured
hidden-desktop frames from the swap-chain hook to the operator's
reader thread. This pipe is created only when the HVNC capability is
actively invoked by the operator over C2.
references:
- https://the-hunters-ledger.com/hunting-detections/kaido-quasar-rat-detections/
author: The Hunters Ledger
date: 2026-07-03
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1219
- attack.collection
- attack.t1113
- detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
category: pipe_created
product: windows
detection:
selection:
PipeName|contains: '\kaido_dxgi_'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- >-
Unlikely — the kaido_dxgi_ pipe-name prefix has not been observed
in any legitimate Windows or third-party software to date
level: medium
Process Named svchost.exe Running From an AppData Path With a Parent Outside System32 and SysWOW64
Tier: Hunting
Robustness: 2
ATT&CK Coverage: T1036.005 (Match Legitimate Name or Location)
ATT&CK Note: T1547.001 (Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder) was listed here as related persistence and is withdrawn: the rule tests a process-creation event for an image name, an AppData path and the parent’s directory, and nothing in it observes a Run key or a Startup folder. The Coverage Gaps section already records that no persistence artifact was observed.
Confidence: MODERATE (install routine recovered from static analysis, not dynamically observed — the malware is C2-gated)
Rationale: The RAT installs into %AppData%\<subdir>\svchost.exe, masquerading as the Windows service host from a user-writable path. The rule carries no KAIDO marker: it matches any process whose image ends in \svchost.exe under an \AppData\ path and whose parent image is not under C:\Windows\System32\ or C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ (a parent such as C:\Windows\explorer.exe is therefore not excluded). The svchost-in-AppData masquerade is a durable technique pattern, but it is used by many unrelated families and carries a meaningful benign FP, so it is a generic masquerade hunting indicator, not a KAIDO-specific detection on its own.
False Positives:
- Rare legitimate portable or sideloaded applications that ship a binary literally named
svchost.exein a user profile path (unusual but not impossible for poorly-vetted freeware). - Other unrelated malware families that reuse the same masquerade pattern.
Deployment: Endpoint EDR / Sysmon-fed SIEM; pair with the YARA/Suricata KAIDO anchors for family attribution before high-confidence alerting.
title: Process Named svchost.exe Executing from AppData Path
id: 08e75208-eb8e-473d-9827-5a59ef4192db
status: experimental
description: >-
Detects a process named svchost.exe launching from a user-writable
%AppData% subdirectory rather than the legitimate %SystemRoot%\System32
location, unless its parent image sits under C:\Windows\System32\ or
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\. The KAIDO Quasar-fork RAT's install routine
(recovered from static analysis, not observed running) uses this
pattern to masquerade as the Windows service host process, but the
rule tests no KAIDO marker, and this naming and path pattern is also
used by other unrelated malware families, so it should be treated as
a generic masquerade indicator rather than a KAIDO-specific signal.
references:
- https://the-hunters-ledger.com/hunting-detections/kaido-quasar-rat-detections/
author: The Hunters Ledger
date: '2026-07-03'
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1036.005
- detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
Image|contains: '\AppData\'
filter_parent_system:
ParentImage|startswith:
- 'C:\Windows\System32\'
- 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
condition: selection and not filter_parent_system
falsepositives:
- >-
Rare legitimate portable or sideloaded applications that ship a
binary literally named svchost.exe in a user profile path
(unusual but not impossible for poorly-vetted freeware)
- Other unrelated malware families that reuse the same masquerade pattern
level: medium
Suricata Signatures
Detection Rules
KAIDO TeamKAIDO C2 TLS Certificate Issuer
Tier: Detection
Robustness: 2
ATT&CK Coverage: T1071.001 (Web Protocols), T1573.001 (Symmetric Cryptography — TLS transport)
Confidence: HIGH
Rationale: The live C2 host presents a TLS certificate with Issuer O=TeamKAIDO (subject CN=kaido-c2) paired with JA4X bbd6cc0fca29_bbd6cc0fca29_795797892f9c. The issuer org string is operator-branded, sits in the right app-layer buffer (tls.cert_issuer), and survives infrastructure rotation — the highest-value fleet-enumeration pivot in the investigation (Censys/Shodan support cert-issuer and JA4X search).
False Positives: None known — TeamKAIDO as a certificate issuer organization string is a distinctive operator-branded value not shared with legitimate CAs or common self-signed certificate generators.
Blind Spots: Evaded if the operator re-issues certificates under a different (or empty) issuer O= string; misses plaintext or non-TLS channels.
Validation: Replay a PCAP of a KAIDO TLS handshake presenting the TeamKAIDO issuer — must alert; ordinary TLS to a public CA must NOT.
Deployment: Network IDS/IPS with TLS certificate inspection (JA3/JA4 fingerprinting recommended as a complementary passive pivot).
alert tls $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:"THL DETECT KAIDO-EvilSoul-MaaS TeamKAIDO C2 TLS Certificate Issuer (RAT C2 Fleet Indicator)"; flow:established,to_server; tls.cert_issuer; content:"TeamKAIDO"; threshold:type limit,track by_src,count 1,seconds 3600; reference:url,the-hunters-ledger.com/hunting-detections/kaido-quasar-rat-detections/; classtype:trojan-activity; sid:9300802; rev:2; metadata:author The_Hunters_Ledger, date 2026-07-03;)
Hunting Rules
Outbound TCP Payload to Port 4782 (Quasar Default Port, KAIDO C2 Port)
Tier: Hunting
Robustness: 1
ATT&CK Coverage: T1095 (Non-Application Layer Protocol)
ATT&CK Note: The report records the Quasar binary protocol over raw TCP on port 4782 (T1095). The rule tests only an established TCP flow with payload to port 4782 and does not parse the protocol, so the mapping is the technique the port is a lead for and not something the rule confirms.
Confidence: HIGH for the port/protocol pairing; the rule itself is a port-anchored lead
Rationale: The RAT’s primary C2 channel is a raw Quasar binary protocol over TCP/4782 with no HTTP layer. TCP/4782 is the Quasar-family default port, but a port is configurable and the port number is the rule’s only discriminator, so it scores Robustness 1 and makes no claim of a protocol fingerprint. The rule carries no content anchor (the protocol is non-standard and unparseable by Suricata’s app-layer engine), so it is a port-based hunting lead rather than an alerting-grade signature: anything else on 4782 will also fire, and Quasar packets themselves are not parsed, so coverage of actual Quasar traffic is NOT CHECKED.
False Positives: Any legitimate or unrelated service that happens to use TCP/4782 (uncommon but not impossible); the threshold limits alert volume per source.
Deployment: Network IDS/IPS at perimeter and internal segmentation points; hunt-tune before alerting.
alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET 4782 (msg:"THL HUNT KAIDO-EvilSoul-MaaS Outbound TCP Payload to Port 4782 (Quasar Default Port, Port-Only Lead)"; flow:established,to_server; dsize:>0; threshold:type limit,track by_src,count 1,seconds 3600; reference:url,the-hunters-ledger.com/hunting-detections/kaido-quasar-rat-detections/; classtype:trojan-activity; sid:9300801; rev:3; metadata:author The_Hunters_Ledger, date 2026-07-03;)
Coverage Gaps
Primary C2 domain routed to the IOC feed, not a rule. kaidoo[.]com[.]br (and the c2. / www. siblings, plus the current A-record 179[.]43[.]150[.]50) are transient atomic indicators: a dns_query signature keyed solely on the domain stops detecting the moment the operator rotates it, and removing the literal leaves no behavior to match. They are carried in kaido-quasar-rat-iocs.json (BLOCK action) instead. The secondary c2[.]kaidoo[.]com[.]br:443 channel is covered there as well. No separate signature is warranted.
HVNC runtime behavioral rule (hidden-desktop capture chain). The HVNC module, hidden-desktop creation via SetThreadDesktop without SwitchDesktop, wholesale browser-profile clone via handle duplication, and DXGI swap-chain capture, is fully recovered from static analysis (DEFINITE/HIGH) but was not triggered in the wild during observation: the RAT withholds all post-connection behavior until a valid Quasar handshake completes (T1480). A precise Sysmon/EDR behavioral rule for the desktop-switch API sequence (CreateDesktop("Default_runhost") → SetThreadDesktop with no matching SwitchDesktop call) cannot be written with DEFINITE confidence from static evidence alone, since API-call-sequence telemetry requires the sequence to actually execute. What would raise confidence: observing the HVNC command execute would capture the exact API call sequence and process/thread telemetry for the desktop-switch pattern.
Persistence mechanism (Registry Run key / Scheduled Task / Windows Service). The install routine references HKCU\...\Run registry writes, a scheduled-task install path, and a Windows service install path (T1547.001, T1053.005, T1543.003, all MODERATE), but none were observed because the RAT never reached the persistence stage. Writing a Sigma rule for a specific registry value name or scheduled task name would require guessing an unobserved parameter, risking either false negatives or unjustified specificity. What would raise confidence: observing the RAT past the C2 handshake, long enough for the actual persistence artifact names/paths to be written.
Process injection into cloned browser processes (T1055, MODERATE). Decompiled code indicates HVNC reflectively injects a capture DLL into the cloned browser process running on the hidden desktop, but the specific injection API sequence (CreateRemoteThread, QueueUserAPC, or another technique) was not confirmed. What would raise confidence: capturing the injection sequence during HVNC execution via debugger or EDR API-hook telemetry.
Embedded pinned-certificate SHA1 thumbprint (0acd8c90641e6e8b085aaf5a541c7ac050a65a4a). This value functions as the Quasar AUTHKEY across all three analyzed builds and is a strong static anchor, but is intentionally not a Suricata TLS-fingerprint rule. It is the client-embedded pinned cert used for the RAT’s own outbound pinning validation, not the server-presented certificate an IDS observes on the wire. It is carried in the IOC feed as a static anchor.
License
Detection rules are licensed under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0).
Free to use, including commercially, with attribution to The Hunters Ledger.
Harrison, J. (2026). Detection Rules — KAIDO Quasar-Fork RAT. The Hunter's Ledger. https://the-hunters-ledger.com/hunting-detections/kaido-quasar-rat-detections/. Published 3 July 2026.
BibTeX
@misc{hunters-ledger-kaido-quasar-rat-detections,
author = {Harrison, Joseph},
title = {Detection Rules — KAIDO Quasar-Fork RAT},
howpublished = {The Hunter's Ledger},
year = {2026},
month = {jul},
url = {https://the-hunters-ledger.com/hunting-detections/kaido-quasar-rat-detections/},
note = {Published 3 July 2026. Licensed CC BY 4.0.}
}