ATT&CK Technique · Command and Control
T1102 Web ServiceMapped by 4 reports, 5 detection rules and 5 tracked actors on The Hunters Ledger. Technique page on attack.mitre.org.
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Reports
Each report maps this technique in its own ATT&CK table, at the confidence the report states. The link opens that table.
Detection rules
Rules whose ATT&CK coverage line names this technique, by detection page. The link opens the page's coverage table.
Detection rules
The Middle Tier: A Non-APT Operator's Reach Into Four Southeast Asian GovernmentsGSocket/THC Backdoor Installer Script: cat.sh (mal_gsocket_catsh_installer_script) (YARA, Hunting); Second-Actor localroot.sbs Loader Domain DNS Query (SURICATA, Detection); Second-Actor cat.sh Loader Payload Retrieval (SURICATA, Detection); GSocket/THC Relay gsocket.io Domain Query (SURICATA, Hunting)
Detection rules
Rhadamanthys MaaS Customer Deep-Dive (79.137.192.3)BellaMain PhaaS Panel PHP Source (YARA, Detection)
Tracked actors
Designations whose reports map this technique.
- UTA-2026-008: Developer and operator of the BellaMain Turkish phishing-as-a-service panel
- UTA-2026-009: Multi-product fraud operator pairing a real VPN service with a brand-impersonation phishing library
- UTA-2026-010: Rhadamanthys MaaS customer with a self-built loader (customer side only, never the vendor)
- UTA-2026-018: Hands-on-keyboard operator exploiting four Southeast Asian governments with a bespoke edge-device toolkit
- UTA-2026-021: Assembler-model intrusion operator staging other actors' tooling against one German victim forest
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