ATT&CK Technique · Stealth
T1480.002 Mutual ExclusionMapped by 1 report, 1 detection rule and 5 tracked actors on The Hunters Ledger. Technique page on attack.mitre.org.
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Reports
Each report maps this technique in its own ATT&CK table, at the confidence the report states. The link opens that table.
Detection rules
Rules whose ATT&CK coverage line names this technique, by detection page. The link opens the page's coverage table.
Detection rules
GHOST Cryptojacker Kit — Vova75Rus Supply Chain (77.110.96.200)MAL_Linux_GHOST_Kit_Shell_Installer (YARA, Detection)
Tracked actors
Designations whose reports map this technique.
- UTA-2026-008: Developer and operator of the BellaMain Turkish phishing-as-a-service panel
- UTA-2026-009: Multi-product fraud operator pairing a real VPN service with a brand-impersonation phishing library
- UTA-2026-010: Rhadamanthys MaaS customer with a self-built loader (customer side only, never the vendor)
- UTA-2026-016: GHOST cryptojacker kit customer (operator A) with self-hosted mining pool proxies
- UTA-2026-017: GHOST cryptojacker kit customer (operator B) using public mining pools, host abandoned
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