ATT&CK Technique · Command and Control
T1090.001 Internal ProxyMapped by 6 reports, 7 detection rules and 5 tracked actors on The Hunters Ledger. Technique page on attack.mitre.org.
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Reports
Each report maps this technique in its own ATT&CK table, at the confidence the report states. The link opens that table.
Detection rules
Rules whose ATT&CK coverage line names this technique, by detection page. The link opens the page's coverage table.
Detection rules
Korean Claude Code + OpenClaw Operator (221.150.15.104)OpenClaw Gateway Service Started (SIGMA, Hunting)
Detection rules
AdaptixC2 Open Directory Exposure (45.130.148.125)Ligolo-ng v0.8.3 Reverse Tunnel Agent (YARA, Detection); Ligolo-ng Reverse Tunnel Agent Execution (SIGMA, Detection)
Detection rules
Chaos Ransomware (TorBrowserTor) Multi-Stage Loader (94.103.1.13)Loopback C2 Connection on Port 20268 (SIGMA, Hunting)
Detection rules
Webserver Compromise Kit (91.236.230.250)revsocks Reverse SOCKS5 Proxy (Go Binary) (YARA, Detection); Reverse SOCKS Proxy Execution via Revsocks Command-Line Flags (SIGMA, Detection); Anachronistic IE11/Win7 User-Agent (Possible revsocks) (SURICATA, Hunting)
Tracked actors
Designations whose reports map this technique.
- UTA-2026-005: Chaos ransomware builder user with a private five-stage crypter
- UTA-2026-006: Stock AdaptixC2 operator with an operator-written PowerShell and .NET injection chain
- UTA-2026-011: Financially motivated operator weaponising a cPanel authentication bypass with a custom harvesting toolkit
- UTA-2026-015: Operator running Claude Code and OpenClaw side by side, observed at capsule depth only
- UTA-2026-023: Telecom-focused operator reaching a carrier's credential plane through a customer's managed router
ATT&CK v19.2. MITRE ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation; technique names are MITRE's and link to MITRE's own pages. The mapping on each linked page is this publication's reading of its own evidence.