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THE HUNTER’S LEDGER
ATT&CK Technique · Collection
T1005 Data from Local System
Mapped by 11 reports, 3 detection rules and 10 tracked actors on The Hunters Ledger. Technique page on attack.mitre.org.

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Reports

Each report maps this technique in its own ATT&CK table, at the confidence the report states. The link opens that table.

Report Sep 2026 · under Collection · HIGH
Sliver C2 Windows Post-Exploitation Staging, 193.233.202.17
Report Aug 2026 · under Collection · HIGH
Carrier Credential Harvesting Through a Customer's Router
Report Aug 2026 · under Collection · HIGH
CloudSync: An Assembler's Intrusion Toolkit
Report Jul 2026 · under Collection · HIGH
EvilSoul-Engine: A Brazilian Stealer-Builder Malware-as-a-Service
Report May 2026 · under Collection · HIGH
Rhadamanthys MaaS Customer Deep-Dive (79.137.192.3)
Report Apr 2026 · under Collection · HIGH
OpenStrike Expanded Toolkit — 106 New Files (2026-04-08)
Report Apr 2026 · under Collection · HIGH
OpenStrike Beacon Toolkit (172.105.0.126)
Report Mar 2026 · under Collection · HIGH
ZeroTrace Multi-Family MaaS Operation (74.0.42.25)
Report Feb 2026 · under Collection · HIGH
Remcos RAT OpenDirectory Campaign

Detection rules

Rules whose ATT&CK coverage line names this technique, by detection page. The link opens the page's coverage table.

Detection rules Jul 2026 · 1 rule
Enough to Be Dangerous: The Mechanics of an LLM-Assisted Intrusion Campaign
Successful External Retrieval of a Spring Boot Actuator Heap Dump (SIGMA, Detection)
Detection rules May 2026 · 1 rule
Russian Gemini CLI Credential Mill (213.165.51.115)
1Password Vault Export File Created or Accessed by Non-1Password Process (SIGMA, Detection)
Detection rules May 2026 · 1 rule
Turkish ARPA AI-Augmented Observability Compromise (209.38.205.158)
Rule 6: ARPA Cross-Source Correlation ETL Engine (YARA, Detection)

Tracked actors

Designations whose reports map this technique.

  • UTA-2026-004: Developer of the OpenStrike multi-implant C2 toolkit, with a cracked Cobalt Strike arsenal
  • UTA-2026-008: Developer and operator of the BellaMain Turkish phishing-as-a-service panel
  • UTA-2026-009: Multi-product fraud operator pairing a real VPN service with a brand-impersonation phishing library
  • UTA-2026-010: Rhadamanthys MaaS customer with a self-built loader (customer side only, never the vendor)
  • UTA-2026-012: AI-augmented credential-mill operator using an LLM for per-target password mutation
  • UTA-2026-013: Espionage-flavoured operator harvesting a state-affiliated insurer's observability stack through an AI agent platform
  • UTA-2026-019: Grey-market personal-data harvester running scores of LLM-assisted attack scripts against Chinese consumer platforms
  • UTA-2026-021: Assembler-model intrusion operator staging other actors' tooling against one German victim forest
  • UTA-2026-023: Telecom-focused operator reaching a carrier's credential plane through a customer's managed router
  • UTA-2026-024: Windows post-exploitation intrusion set with Sliver and a blockchain-resolved implant

ATT&CK v19.2. MITRE ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation; technique names are MITRE's and link to MITRE's own pages. The mapping on each linked page is this publication's reading of its own evidence.