ATT&CK Technique · Stealth
T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationMapped by 14 reports, 32 detection rules and 13 tracked actors on The Hunters Ledger. Technique page on attack.mitre.org.
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Reports
Each report maps this technique in its own ATT&CK table, at the confidence the report states. The link opens that table.
Detection rules
Rules whose ATT&CK coverage line names this technique, by detection page. The link opens the page's coverage table.
Detection rules
Gotenberg CVE-2026-42589 Mass Exploitation and CryptominingPolkitd Daemon Executed From a Non-Standard Directory (SIGMA, Detection)
Detection rules
Sliver C2 Windows Post-Exploitation Staging, 193.233.202.17Suspicious svchost.log File Created In Roaming AppData (SIGMA, Detection); node.exe Executing From A Vendor-Named LOCALAPPDATA Directory (SIGMA, Detection)
Detection rules
CloudSync: An Assembler's Intrusion ToolkitCloudSync Public-Profile Working Directory Artifacts (YARA, Hunting); CloudSync Tor Hidden Service Staging Under Public Profile (SIGMA, Detection); Photo Studio Masquerade Loader Files Under LocalAppData (SIGMA, Detection); Tilde Prefixed Executable Written To User Startup Folder (SIGMA, Hunting)
Detection rules
GOCLOUD Multi-Service CryptojackingGOCLOUD_Windows_Deploy_Worm_Lingkai (YARA, Detection); Svchost Executed From Non-System Directory (SIGMA, Detection); Scheduled Task Registering SYSTEM Action In User AppData (SIGMA, Detection)
Detection rules
KAIDO: A Brazilian Quasar-Fork RAT with Hidden-Desktop Session HijackingKAIDO Install as svchost.exe by Non-System Parent Process (SIGMA, Hunting)
Detection rules
GHOST Cryptojacker Kit — Vova75Rus Supply Chain (77.110.96.200)GHOST Kit Systemd Camouflage Service Unit Creation (SIGMA, Detection)
Detection rules
Inkognito Russian VPN/Phishing Operator (INK VPN / INK Lens)Inkognito INK VPN JS Bundle (Brand/API String Combination) (YARA, Detection); Inkognito INK VPN Favicon SVG (Hash-or-Brand-String) (YARA, Detection); Inkognito Brand-Impersonation Subdomain DNS Query (Wildcard) (SIGMA, Hunting)
Detection rules
HijackLoader / Penguish / Rugmi to AsyncRAT Multi-Vector Phishing CampaignInno Setup Pascal Anti-Triage Wrapper (YARA, Hunting); HijackLoader Inno Setup Wrapper Spawning CrystSupervisor32 and WVault Process Chain (SIGMA, Hunting); HijackLoader Covert IPC Named Pipe WondershareCrashServices Created (SIGMA, Hunting); HijackLoader Operator Persistence Directory adv_ctrl Created Under ProgramData (SIGMA, Hunting); HijackLoader WVault.exe Hollow-Host Launched Directly from Inno Setup Temp Directory (SIGMA, Hunting); WVault.exe or Renamed Vendor Binary Executing from Non-Standard ProgramData Path (SIGMA, Hunting)
Detection rules
Chaos Ransomware (TorBrowserTor) Multi-Stage Loader (94.103.1.13)Stage-4 Masquerade Scheduled Task Created at Root Path (SIGMA, Hunting); Stage-4 Fileless Payload Written to Masquerade Registry Key (SIGMA, Hunting); Masquerade Persistence via Run Key "Microsoft Store" (SIGMA, Hunting)
Detection rules
OpenStrike Expanded Toolkit — 106 New Files (2026-04-08)OpenStrike DLL Loader (YARA, Hunting); DceRpcSs Masquerading Service Installation (SIGMA, Hunting); Cobalt Strike Beacon DLL Dropped to Windows Temp Directory (SIGMA, Hunting)
Detection rules
ZeroTrace Multi-Family MaaS Operation (74.0.42.25)vlc_boxed.exe Run Key Persistence via VLC Name Masquerade (SIGMA, Detection); Raven RAT Persistence via WindowsService Run Key Masquerade (SIGMA, Hunting)
Detection rules
Sliver C2 Toolchain with ScareCrow Loader (45.94.31.220)Process Claims MicrosoftEdgeUpdate Identity from Non-Standard Location (SIGMA, Hunting)
Detection rules
Hybrid Loader/Stealer Ecosystem Masquerading as SogouSogouStealer Ecosystem Indicators (Combined Fingerprint) (YARA, Detection); SogouStealer Masquerading NSIS Installer Execution (SIGMA, Hunting)
Tracked actors
Designations whose reports map this technique.
- UTA-2026-001: Sliver C2 operator with an automated ScareCrow, Donut and SysWhispers3 build pipeline
- UTA-2026-004: Developer of the OpenStrike multi-implant C2 toolkit, with a cracked Cobalt Strike arsenal
- UTA-2026-005: Chaos ransomware builder user with a private five-stage crypter
- UTA-2026-007: HijackLoader customer running a 15-month multi-vector phishing campaign into an AsyncRAT-class RAT
- UTA-2026-008: Developer and operator of the BellaMain Turkish phishing-as-a-service panel
- UTA-2026-009: Multi-product fraud operator pairing a real VPN service with a brand-impersonation phishing library
- UTA-2026-016: GHOST cryptojacker kit customer (operator A) with self-hosted mining pool proxies
- UTA-2026-017: GHOST cryptojacker kit customer (operator B) using public mining pools, host abandoned
- UTA-2026-018: Hands-on-keyboard operator exploiting four Southeast Asian governments with a bespoke edge-device toolkit
- UTA-2026-020: Self-branded commodity cryptojacking operator mass-exploiting exposed Chinese enterprise software
- UTA-2026-021: Assembler-model intrusion operator staging other actors' tooling against one German victim forest
- UTA-2026-023: Telecom-focused operator reaching a carrier's credential plane through a customer's managed router
- UTA-2026-024: Windows post-exploitation intrusion set with Sliver and a blockchain-resolved implant
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