ATT&CK Technique · Execution
T1059.005 Visual BasicMapped by 7 reports, 5 detection rules and 3 tracked actors on The Hunters Ledger. Technique page on attack.mitre.org.
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Reports
Each report maps this technique in its own ATT&CK table, at the confidence the report states. The link opens that table.
Report
Quasar + XWorm + PowerShell
Detection rules
Rules whose ATT&CK coverage line names this technique, by detection page. The link opens the page's coverage table.
Detection rules
GOCLOUD Multi-Service CryptojackingScript Host Executing VBScript From Windows Temp (SIGMA, Hunting)
Detection rules
Flask C2 & MSSQL CLR Backdoor on a Windows Post-Exploitation Staging Hostmiss.asp: Ghost小组 ASP Webshell (Aatrox Eval Gadget) (YARA, Hunting); IIS Webshell Execution: w3wp.exe Spawning cmd.exe or WScript (SIGMA, Detection)
Detection rules
HijackLoader / Penguish / Rugmi to AsyncRAT Multi-Vector Phishing CampaignMulti-Vector Lure: GrimResource MSC + Mega.io Payload Fetch (YARA, Detection)
Detection rules
ZeroTrace Multi-Family MaaS Operation (74.0.42.25)ScreenConnect Phishing VBScript Dropper Silent MSI Install Chain (SIGMA, Detection)
Tracked actors
Designations whose reports map this technique.
- UTA-2026-007: HijackLoader customer running a 15-month multi-vector phishing campaign into an AsyncRAT-class RAT
- UTA-2026-020: Self-branded commodity cryptojacking operator mass-exploiting exposed Chinese enterprise software
- UTA-2026-021: Assembler-model intrusion operator staging other actors' tooling against one German victim forest
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