ATT&CK Technique · Defense Impairment / Persistence
T1112 Modify Registry
Mapped by 5 reports, 8 detection rules and 7 tracked actors on The Hunters Ledger. Technique page on attack.mitre.org.
5Reportsmap it in their ATT&CK table
8Detection rulesacross 6 detection pages
7Tracked actorsreports map it
2TacticsDefense Impairment / Persistence
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Reports
5 reportsConfidence the reports state
5 reports, one barHIGH 4DEFINITE 1
Each report maps this technique in its own ATT&CK table, at the confidence the report states. The link opens that table.
Detection rules
8 rulesRules whose ATT&CK coverage line names this technique, by detection page. The link opens the page's coverage table.
Detection rules
Sliver C2 Windows Post-Exploitation Staging, 193[.]233[.]202[.]17
RDP, UAC Or Token-Filter Registry Value Weakened (SIGMA, Hunting)
Detection rules
Rhadamanthys MaaS Customer Deep-Dive (79[.]137[.]192[.]3)
Rhadamanthys SibCode Software Registry Key Marker (SIGMA, Hunting)
Detection rules
HijackLoader / Penguish / Rugmi to AsyncRAT Multi-Vector Phishing Campaign
Office VBA Macro Security Disabled via Registry VBAWarnings Set to 1 (SIGMA, Hunting)
Detection rules
Chaos Ransomware (TorBrowserTor) Multi-Stage Loader (94[.]103[.]1[.]13)
Stage-4 Mutex GUID (Cross-Build Invariant) (YARA, Detection); Stage-4 Fileless Payload Written to Masquerade Registry Key (SIGMA, Hunting)
Detection rules
ZeroTrace Multi-Family MaaS Operation (74[.]0[.]42[.]25)
XWorm V5.6 Operator Configuration Registry Key Write (SIGMA, Detection)
Detection rules
Houselet.exe — The Go-Based Loader Masquerading as PlayStation Remote Play
Internet Explorer ZoneMap Registry Modification (SIGMA, Hunting); Internet Settings Proxy Registry Modification (SIGMA, Hunting)
Tracked actors
7 actorsDesignations whose reports map this technique.
UTA-2026-005Chaos ransomware builder user with a private five-stage crypterUTA-2026-007HijackLoader customer running a 15-month multi-vector phishing campaign into an AsyncRAT-class RATUTA-2026-008Developer and operator of the BellaMain Turkish phishing-as-a-service panelUTA-2026-009Multi-product fraud operator pairing a real VPN service with a brand-impersonation phishing libraryUTA-2026-010Rhadamanthys MaaS customer with a self-built loader (customer side only, never the vendor)UTA-2026-021Assembler-model intrusion operator staging other actors' tooling against one German victim forestUTA-2026-024Windows post-exploitation intrusion set with Sliver and a blockchain-resolved implant
ATT&CK v19.2. MITRE ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation; technique names are MITRE's and link to MITRE's own pages. The mapping on each linked page is this publication's reading of its own evidence.