ATT&CK Technique · Defense Impairment / Persistence
T1112 Modify RegistryMapped by 5 reports, 8 detection rules and 7 tracked actors on The Hunters Ledger. Technique page on attack.mitre.org.
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Reports
Each report maps this technique in its own ATT&CK table, at the confidence the report states. The link opens that table.
Detection rules
Rules whose ATT&CK coverage line names this technique, by detection page. The link opens the page's coverage table.
Detection rules
Sliver C2 Windows Post-Exploitation Staging, 193.233.202.17RDP, UAC Or Token-Filter Registry Value Weakened (SIGMA, Hunting)
Detection rules
Rhadamanthys MaaS Customer Deep-Dive (79.137.192.3)Rhadamanthys SibCode Software Registry Key Marker (SIGMA, Detection)
Detection rules
HijackLoader / Penguish / Rugmi to AsyncRAT Multi-Vector Phishing CampaignOffice VBA Macro Security Disabled via Registry VBAWarnings Set to 1 (SIGMA, Hunting)
Detection rules
Chaos Ransomware (TorBrowserTor) Multi-Stage Loader (94.103.1.13)Stage-4 Mutex GUID (Cross-Build Invariant) (YARA, Detection); Stage-4 Fileless Payload Written to Masquerade Registry Key (SIGMA, Hunting)
Detection rules
ZeroTrace Multi-Family MaaS Operation (74.0.42.25)XWorm V5.6 Operator Configuration Registry Key Write (SIGMA, Detection)
Detection rules
Houselet.exe — The Go-Based Loader Masquerading as PlayStation Remote PlayInternet Explorer ZoneMap Registry Modification (SIGMA, Hunting); Internet Settings Proxy Registry Modification (SIGMA, Hunting)
Tracked actors
Designations whose reports map this technique.
- UTA-2026-005: Chaos ransomware builder user with a private five-stage crypter
- UTA-2026-007: HijackLoader customer running a 15-month multi-vector phishing campaign into an AsyncRAT-class RAT
- UTA-2026-008: Developer and operator of the BellaMain Turkish phishing-as-a-service panel
- UTA-2026-009: Multi-product fraud operator pairing a real VPN service with a brand-impersonation phishing library
- UTA-2026-010: Rhadamanthys MaaS customer with a self-built loader (customer side only, never the vendor)
- UTA-2026-021: Assembler-model intrusion operator staging other actors' tooling against one German victim forest
- UTA-2026-024: Windows post-exploitation intrusion set with Sliver and a blockchain-resolved implant
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