ATT&CK Technique · Command and Control
T1573.002 Asymmetric CryptographyMapped by 6 reports, 3 detection rules and 7 tracked actors on The Hunters Ledger. Technique page on attack.mitre.org.
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Reports
Each report maps this technique in its own ATT&CK table, at the confidence the report states. The link opens that table.
Detection rules
Rules whose ATT&CK coverage line names this technique, by detection page. The link opens the page's coverage table.
Detection rules
OpenStrike Expanded Toolkit — 106 New Files (2026-04-08)OpenStrike Gen-1 and Gen-2 Prototype Beacons (YARA, Detection)
Detection rules
Open Directory at 193.56.255.154 — XiebroC2 v3.1 & Covenant C2Covenant C2 GruntStager Combined Build Detection (YARA, Detection)
Detection rules
ZeroTrace Multi-Family MaaS Operation (74.0.42.25)PureRAT v4.1.9 Protocol Preamble Before TLS (SURICATA, Detection)
Tracked actors
Designations whose reports map this technique.
- UTA-2026-001: Sliver C2 operator with an automated ScareCrow, Donut and SysWhispers3 build pipeline
- UTA-2026-002: XiebroC2 and Covenant operator working from a Chinese-language build environment
- UTA-2026-004: Developer of the OpenStrike multi-implant C2 toolkit, with a cracked Cobalt Strike arsenal
- UTA-2026-008: Developer and operator of the BellaMain Turkish phishing-as-a-service panel
- UTA-2026-009: Multi-product fraud operator pairing a real VPN service with a brand-impersonation phishing library
- UTA-2026-010: Rhadamanthys MaaS customer with a self-built loader (customer side only, never the vendor)
- UTA-2026-024: Windows post-exploitation intrusion set with Sliver and a blockchain-resolved implant
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