ATT&CK Technique · Defense Impairment
T1685 Disable or Modify ToolsMapped by 13 reports, 25 detection rules and 9 tracked actors on The Hunters Ledger. Technique page on attack.mitre.org.
← All techniques and the coverage heatmap
Reports
Each report maps this technique in its own ATT&CK table, at the confidence the report states. The link opens that table.
Report
Quasar + XWorm + PowerShell
Detection rules
Rules whose ATT&CK coverage line names this technique, by detection page. The link opens the page's coverage table.
Detection rules
FACEIT ClickFix Pages Point CS2 Players to a Script URL That VirusTotal Ties to a Steam-Focused ExecutableDefender Path, Process and Extension Exclusions Set in One PowerShell Script Block (SIGMA, Hunting)
Detection rules
Sliver C2 Windows Post-Exploitation Staging, 193.233.202.17Multiple Endpoint Protection Services Stopped In A Short Window (SIGMA, Hunting)
Detection rules
CloudSync: An Assembler's Intrusion ToolkitWindows Defender Tampering Via Set-MpPreference Disable Switches (SIGMA, Detection); AMSI Bypass Via AmsiUtils AmsiInitFailed Field SetValue (SIGMA, Detection)
Detection rules
GOCLOUD Multi-Service CryptojackingGOCLOUD_Windows_Miner_WinJenkins (YARA, Detection); Defender Real-Time Monitoring Disabled With Exclusion Added (SIGMA, Detection)
Detection rules
EvilSoul-Engine: A Brazilian Stealer-Builder Malware-as-a-ServiceWhole-Drive Defender Exclusion Combined with Real-Time Monitoring Disable (SIGMA, Detection)
Detection rules
Multi-Actor AI-Agent Framework Abuse (8 Operators)Claude Code settings.local.json or settings.json Modified (SIGMA, Hunting)
Detection rules
Korean Claude Code + OpenClaw Operator (221.150.15.104)OpenClaw-Specific Claude Code Allowlist (YARA, Detection); Generic Curl-Pipe-Bash Pattern in Claude Code Allowlist (YARA, Hunting); Claude Code settings.local.json Written or Modified (SIGMA, Hunting); OpenClaw Curl-Pipe-Bash Installer Execution (SIGMA, Hunting); OpenClaw Gateway Service Started (SIGMA, Hunting); NPM Registry Fetch for OpenClaw Package (SIGMA, Hunting)
Detection rules
HijackLoader / Penguish / Rugmi to AsyncRAT Multi-Vector Phishing CampaignHijackLoader GrimResource MMC Spawning PowerShell Adding Defender Exclusion (SIGMA, Detection)
Detection rules
AdaptixC2 Open Directory Exposure (45.130.148.125)AdaptixC2 PowerShell Loader: AMSI Bypass and SI Injector Invocation (YARA, Hunting); AdaptixC2 PowerShell Loader: AMSI Bypass and SI Injector Invocation (SIGMA, Hunting); Potential AMSI Bypass via Reflection Over Assembly Types and Private Field Zeroing (SIGMA, Hunting)
Detection rules
Chaos Ransomware (TorBrowserTor) Multi-Stage Loader (94.103.1.13)Task Manager Disabled via Registry Policy (SIGMA, Hunting)
Detection rules
Shadow RAT & XWorm Open Directory CampaignShadow RAT v2.6.4.0: AMSI + ETW Bypass Chain (YARA, Detection); AMSI Bypass via Suspicious amsi.dll Load from Non-Standard Path (SIGMA, Hunting); ETW Bypass via Process Access to ntdll.dll Memory Region (SIGMA, Hunting)
Detection rules
Sliver C2 Toolchain with ScareCrow Loader (45.94.31.220)Sliver Stager PowerShell AMSI Bypass via Reflection (SIGMA, Detection); Windows Defender Real-Time Protection Disabled (SIGMA, Detection)
Detection rules
Quasar + XWorm + PowerShellPowerShell Microsoft Defender Exclusion Script (YARA, Hunting)
Tracked actors
Designations whose reports map this technique.
- UTA-2026-001: Sliver C2 operator with an automated ScareCrow, Donut and SysWhispers3 build pipeline
- UTA-2026-003: Commodity MaaS consumer running Shadow RAT and XWorm from one Windows VPS
- UTA-2026-005: Chaos ransomware builder user with a private five-stage crypter
- UTA-2026-006: Stock AdaptixC2 operator with an operator-written PowerShell and .NET injection chain
- UTA-2026-007: HijackLoader customer running a 15-month multi-vector phishing campaign into an AsyncRAT-class RAT
- UTA-2026-015: Operator running Claude Code and OpenClaw side by side, observed at capsule depth only
- UTA-2026-020: Self-branded commodity cryptojacking operator mass-exploiting exposed Chinese enterprise software
- UTA-2026-021: Assembler-model intrusion operator staging other actors' tooling against one German victim forest
- UTA-2026-024: Windows post-exploitation intrusion set with Sliver and a blockchain-resolved implant
ATT&CK v19.2. MITRE ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation; technique names are MITRE's and link to MITRE's own pages. The mapping on each linked page is this publication's reading of its own evidence.