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Reports

Each report maps this technique in its own ATT&CK table, at the confidence the report states. The link opens that table.

Detection rules

Rules whose ATT&CK coverage line names this technique, by detection page. The link opens the page's coverage table.

Tracked actors

Designations whose reports map this technique.

• UTA-2026-002: XiebroC2 and Covenant operator working from a Chinese-language build environment
• UTA-2026-008: Developer and operator of the BellaMain Turkish phishing-as-a-service panel
• UTA-2026-009: Multi-product fraud operator pairing a real VPN service with a brand-impersonation phishing library
• UTA-2026-010: Rhadamanthys MaaS customer with a self-built loader (customer side only, never the vendor)
• UTA-2026-018: Hands-on-keyboard operator exploiting four Southeast Asian governments with a bespoke edge-device toolkit
• UTA-2026-020: Self-branded commodity cryptojacking operator mass-exploiting exposed Chinese enterprise software
• UTA-2026-023: Telecom-focused operator reaching a carrier's credential plane through a customer's managed router
• UTA-2026-024: Windows post-exploitation intrusion set with Sliver and a blockchain-resolved implant

ATT&CK v19.2. MITRE ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation; technique names are MITRE's and link to MITRE's own pages. The mapping on each linked page is this publication's reading of its own evidence.