ATT&CK Technique · Command and Control
T1105 Ingress Tool TransferMapped by 17 reports, 26 detection rules and 14 tracked actors on The Hunters Ledger. Technique page on attack.mitre.org.
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Reports
Each report maps this technique in its own ATT&CK table, at the confidence the report states. The link opens that table.
Detection rules
Rules whose ATT&CK coverage line names this technique, by detection page. The link opens the page's coverage table.
Detection rules
FACEIT ClickFix Pages Point CS2 Players to a Script URL That VirusTotal Ties to a Steam-Focused ExecutableFirst-Stage Script Fetch (y.ps1 URI Path) (SURICATA, Hunting); Second-Stage Executable Fetch (x.exe URI Path to Delivery Host) (SURICATA, Hunting)
Detection rules
Sliver C2 Windows Post-Exploitation Staging, 193.233.202.17certutil Or WMIC-Invoked certutil Downloading From A Bare IP High Port (SIGMA, Detection); Node.js Runtime Fetched And Extracted On A Host With No Development Toolchain (SIGMA, Hunting)
Detection rules
Carrier Credential Harvesting Through a Customer's RouterChisel or PuTTY Plink Binary Written to Disk (SIGMA, Hunting)
Detection rules
The Middle Tier: A Non-APT Operator's Reach Into Four Southeast Asian GovernmentsGSocket Deployment: gsocket.io Installer Retrieval TLS SNI (SURICATA, Hunting)
Detection rules
CloudSync: An Assembler's Intrusion Toolkitct.bat Proxy-Aware USB Worm Stub (YARA, Detection)
Detection rules
GOCLOUD Multi-Service CryptojackingGOCLOUD_BatchExploit_Dispatcher (YARA, Detection); GOCLOUD_Listener2_Control_Plane (YARA, Detection); Certutil Download Cradle Fetching Remote Payload (SIGMA, Detection); PowerShell IEX Download Cradle From Remote Host (SIGMA, Hunting); GOCLOUD Windows Worm Component Retrieval (SURICATA, Detection); GOCLOUD Linux Miner Delivery One-Liner (SURICATA, Hunting)
Detection rules
Enough to Be Dangerous: The Mechanics of an LLM-Assisted Intrusion CampaignEureka Apps-Delta Response Containing XStream Gadget Markers (Flowbits Pair) (SURICATA, Detection)
Detection rules
EvilSoul-Engine: A Brazilian Stealer-Builder Malware-as-a-ServiceEvilSoul-Engine 299a2e7f Socket.IO WebPanel Build (YARA, Detection); ChromElevator ABE-Bypass Tool Dropped to TEMP Executor Directory (SIGMA, Hunting)
Detection rules
Flask C2 & MSSQL CLR Backdoor on a Windows Post-Exploitation Staging HostFlask C2 Health Endpoint: Distinctive JSON Field-Combo (SURICATA, Detection)
Detection rules
GHOST Cryptojacker Kit — Vova75Rus Supply Chain (77.110.96.200)GHOST Kit Distribution File Download from AEZA Hosting Range (SURICATA, Detection)
Detection rules
Russian Gemini CLI Credential Mill (213.165.51.115)PowerShell WindowsUpdateManager Stealer Loader (YARA, Detection)
Detection rules
HijackLoader / Penguish / Rugmi to AsyncRAT Multi-Vector Phishing CampaignMulti-Vector Lure: GrimResource MSC + Mega.io Payload Fetch (YARA, Detection)
Detection rules
Chaos Ransomware (TorBrowserTor) Multi-Stage Loader (94.103.1.13)XOR-Encoded Payload Staging Download (.xor URI Suffix) (SURICATA, Hunting)
Detection rules
Sliver C2 Toolchain with ScareCrow Loader (45.94.31.220)PowerShell WebClient DownloadFile Execution (Sliver Stager Download Pattern) (SIGMA, Hunting); PowerShell Drops Executable to TEMP Directory (SIGMA, Hunting)
Detection rules
NsMiner: Multi-Stage Cryptojacking OperationNsMiner_Dropper_Downloader (YARA, Detection)
Detection rules
Hybrid Loader/Stealer Ecosystem Masquerading as SogouSogouStealer Artifact Drop and Staging (SIGMA, Detection)
Detection rules
Quasar + XWorm + PowerShellVBScript-Spawned PowerShell In-Memory Payload Download (SIGMA, Hunting)
Tracked actors
Designations whose reports map this technique.
- UTA-2026-001: Sliver C2 operator with an automated ScareCrow, Donut and SysWhispers3 build pipeline
- UTA-2026-002: XiebroC2 and Covenant operator working from a Chinese-language build environment
- UTA-2026-004: Developer of the OpenStrike multi-implant C2 toolkit, with a cracked Cobalt Strike arsenal
- UTA-2026-006: Stock AdaptixC2 operator with an operator-written PowerShell and .NET injection chain
- UTA-2026-007: HijackLoader customer running a 15-month multi-vector phishing campaign into an AsyncRAT-class RAT
- UTA-2026-012: AI-augmented credential-mill operator using an LLM for per-target password mutation
- UTA-2026-016: GHOST cryptojacker kit customer (operator A) with self-hosted mining pool proxies
- UTA-2026-017: GHOST cryptojacker kit customer (operator B) using public mining pools, host abandoned
- UTA-2026-018: Hands-on-keyboard operator exploiting four Southeast Asian governments with a bespoke edge-device toolkit
- UTA-2026-019: Grey-market personal-data harvester running scores of LLM-assisted attack scripts against Chinese consumer platforms
- UTA-2026-020: Self-branded commodity cryptojacking operator mass-exploiting exposed Chinese enterprise software
- UTA-2026-021: Assembler-model intrusion operator staging other actors' tooling against one German victim forest
- UTA-2026-023: Telecom-focused operator reaching a carrier's credential plane through a customer's managed router
- UTA-2026-024: Windows post-exploitation intrusion set with Sliver and a blockchain-resolved implant
ATT&CK v19.2. MITRE ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation; technique names are MITRE's and link to MITRE's own pages. The mapping on each linked page is this publication's reading of its own evidence.