← All techniques and the coverage heatmap

Reports

Each report maps this technique in its own ATT&CK table, at the confidence the report states. The link opens that table.

Detection rules

Rules whose ATT&CK coverage line names this technique, by detection page. The link opens the page's coverage table.

Tracked actors

Designations whose reports map this technique.

• UTA-2026-002: XiebroC2 and Covenant operator working from a Chinese-language build environment
• UTA-2026-003: Commodity MaaS consumer running Shadow RAT and XWorm from one Windows VPS
• UTA-2026-004: Developer of the OpenStrike multi-implant C2 toolkit, with a cracked Cobalt Strike arsenal
• UTA-2026-006: Stock AdaptixC2 operator with an operator-written PowerShell and .NET injection chain
• UTA-2026-007: HijackLoader customer running a 15-month multi-vector phishing campaign into an AsyncRAT-class RAT
• UTA-2026-008: Developer and operator of the BellaMain Turkish phishing-as-a-service panel
• UTA-2026-009: Multi-product fraud operator pairing a real VPN service with a brand-impersonation phishing library
• UTA-2026-010: Rhadamanthys MaaS customer with a self-built loader (customer side only, never the vendor)

ATT&CK v19.2. MITRE ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation; technique names are MITRE's and link to MITRE's own pages. The mapping on each linked page is this publication's reading of its own evidence.