ATT&CK Technique · Stealth / Privilege Escalation
T1055.012 Process HollowingMapped by 8 reports, 8 detection rules and 8 tracked actors on The Hunters Ledger. Technique page on attack.mitre.org.
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Reports
Each report maps this technique in its own ATT&CK table, at the confidence the report states. The link opens that table.
Detection rules
Rules whose ATT&CK coverage line names this technique, by detection page. The link opens the page's coverage table.
Detection rules
EvilSoul-Engine: A Brazilian Stealer-Builder Malware-as-a-Servicexaitax ChromElevator ABE-Bypass Tool: @breakingupslow Fork (YARA, Detection)
Detection rules
Rhadamanthys MaaS Customer Deep-Dive (79.137.192.3)Rhadamanthys EAX-Redirect Process Hollowing Into InstallUtil.exe (SIGMA, Detection)
Detection rules
HijackLoader / Penguish / Rugmi to AsyncRAT Multi-Vector Phishing CampaignExceptionHandler.dll Plowshare Dispatcher (YARA, Detection); pe_03 HijackLoader Stage-3 Loader (API Hash Table) (YARA, Detection); HijackLoader WVault.exe Hollow-Host Launched Directly from Inno Setup Temp Directory (SIGMA, Hunting)
Detection rules
Open Directory at 193.56.255.154 — XiebroC2 v3.1 & Covenant C2XiebroC2 v3.1 Go TCP Implant: Source-Code Artifact Combination (YARA, Detection)
Detection rules
Sliver C2 Toolchain with ScareCrow Loader (45.94.31.220)ScareCrow Go Loader (OneDriveSync.exe) (YARA, Detection); sihost.exe Initiating Anomalous Outbound Network Connection (SIGMA, Detection)
Tracked actors
Designations whose reports map this technique.
- UTA-2026-001: Sliver C2 operator with an automated ScareCrow, Donut and SysWhispers3 build pipeline
- UTA-2026-002: XiebroC2 and Covenant operator working from a Chinese-language build environment
- UTA-2026-003: Commodity MaaS consumer running Shadow RAT and XWorm from one Windows VPS
- UTA-2026-004: Developer of the OpenStrike multi-implant C2 toolkit, with a cracked Cobalt Strike arsenal
- UTA-2026-007: HijackLoader customer running a 15-month multi-vector phishing campaign into an AsyncRAT-class RAT
- UTA-2026-008: Developer and operator of the BellaMain Turkish phishing-as-a-service panel
- UTA-2026-009: Multi-product fraud operator pairing a real VPN service with a brand-impersonation phishing library
- UTA-2026-010: Rhadamanthys MaaS customer with a self-built loader (customer side only, never the vendor)
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