ATT&CK Technique · Stealth
T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationMapped by 14 reports, 13 detection rules and 13 tracked actors on The Hunters Ledger. Technique page on attack.mitre.org.
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Reports
Each report maps this technique in its own ATT&CK table, at the confidence the report states. The link opens that table.
Detection rules
Rules whose ATT&CK coverage line names this technique, by detection page. The link opens the page's coverage table.
Detection rules
Gotenberg CVE-2026-42589 Mass Exploitation and CryptominingBase64 Decoded Script Written to Tmp and Executed by Bash (SIGMA, Hunting)
Detection rules
CloudSync: An Assembler's Intrusion Toolkitsvhost.js Fileless Loader: Custom Alphabet (YARA, Detection)
Detection rules
GOCLOUD Multi-Service CryptojackingCertutil Download Cradle Fetching Remote Payload (SIGMA, Detection)
Detection rules
Flask C2 & MSSQL CLR Backdoor on a Windows Post-Exploitation Staging HostNPCInfoList1.aspx: AES .NET Loader Webshell (Godzilla-Style) (YARA, Detection)
Detection rules
Rhadamanthys MaaS Customer Deep-Dive (79.137.192.3)Rhadamanthys .frontb Stage-2 Section Marker (YARA, Detection); Rhadamanthys Stage-2 Minimal Import Surface (YARA, Hunting); Rhadamanthys Customer-Specific Stage-2 CBC-XOR IV (YARA, Hunting); Rhadamanthys Customer-Specific Loader RC4 Key (YARA, Hunting)
Detection rules
Chaos Ransomware (TorBrowserTor) Multi-Stage Loader (94.103.1.13)Batch Dropper Structural Anchors (YARA, Detection); mymain Build In-Memory Crypter Keys (YARA, Hunting); myfile Build In-Memory Crypter Keys (YARA, Hunting)
Detection rules
Open Directory at 193.56.255.154 — XiebroC2 v3.1 & Covenant C2Covenant PowerShell Fileless Loader: GruntHTTP.ps1 (YARA, Detection); PowerShell Fileless Loader: Deflate Decode with Reflective Assembly Load (SIGMA, Hunting)
Tracked actors
Designations whose reports map this technique.
- UTA-2026-001: Sliver C2 operator with an automated ScareCrow, Donut and SysWhispers3 build pipeline
- UTA-2026-002: XiebroC2 and Covenant operator working from a Chinese-language build environment
- UTA-2026-004: Developer of the OpenStrike multi-implant C2 toolkit, with a cracked Cobalt Strike arsenal
- UTA-2026-005: Chaos ransomware builder user with a private five-stage crypter
- UTA-2026-006: Stock AdaptixC2 operator with an operator-written PowerShell and .NET injection chain
- UTA-2026-007: HijackLoader customer running a 15-month multi-vector phishing campaign into an AsyncRAT-class RAT
- UTA-2026-008: Developer and operator of the BellaMain Turkish phishing-as-a-service panel
- UTA-2026-009: Multi-product fraud operator pairing a real VPN service with a brand-impersonation phishing library
- UTA-2026-010: Rhadamanthys MaaS customer with a self-built loader (customer side only, never the vendor)
- UTA-2026-018: Hands-on-keyboard operator exploiting four Southeast Asian governments with a bespoke edge-device toolkit
- UTA-2026-020: Self-branded commodity cryptojacking operator mass-exploiting exposed Chinese enterprise software
- UTA-2026-021: Assembler-model intrusion operator staging other actors' tooling against one German victim forest
- UTA-2026-024: Windows post-exploitation intrusion set with Sliver and a blockchain-resolved implant
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