ATT&CK Technique · Collection / Credential Access
T1056.001 KeyloggingMapped by 11 reports, 4 detection rules and 8 tracked actors on The Hunters Ledger. Technique page on attack.mitre.org.
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Reports
Each report maps this technique in its own ATT&CK table, at the confidence the report states. The link opens that table.
Detection rules
Rules whose ATT&CK coverage line names this technique, by detection page. The link opens the page's coverage table.
Detection rules
Chaos Ransomware (TorBrowserTor) Multi-Stage Loader (94.103.1.13)Orcus RAT v7 Wardow Crack (YARA, Detection)
Detection rules
Remcos RAT OpenDirectory CampaignRemcos RAT Family Detection (YARA, Detection); Remcos Surveillance Module (Log-String Anchored) (YARA, Detection); Remcos Surveillance Module (Generic API Cluster) (YARA, Hunting)
Tracked actors
Designations whose reports map this technique.
- UTA-2026-003: Commodity MaaS consumer running Shadow RAT and XWorm from one Windows VPS
- UTA-2026-005: Chaos ransomware builder user with a private five-stage crypter
- UTA-2026-006: Stock AdaptixC2 operator with an operator-written PowerShell and .NET injection chain
- UTA-2026-007: HijackLoader customer running a 15-month multi-vector phishing campaign into an AsyncRAT-class RAT
- UTA-2026-008: Developer and operator of the BellaMain Turkish phishing-as-a-service panel
- UTA-2026-009: Multi-product fraud operator pairing a real VPN service with a brand-impersonation phishing library
- UTA-2026-010: Rhadamanthys MaaS customer with a self-built loader (customer side only, never the vendor)
- UTA-2026-021: Assembler-model intrusion operator staging other actors' tooling against one German victim forest
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