ATT&CK Technique · Execution
T1059.003 Windows Command ShellMapped by 15 reports, 6 detection rules and 9 tracked actors on The Hunters Ledger. Technique page on attack.mitre.org.
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Reports
Each report maps this technique in its own ATT&CK table, at the confidence the report states. The link opens that table.
Detection rules
Rules whose ATT&CK coverage line names this technique, by detection page. The link opens the page's coverage table.
Detection rules
Carrier Credential Harvesting Through a Customer's RouterCommand Shell Spawned by a Web Server or Application Server Process (SIGMA, Detection)
Detection rules
Flask C2 & MSSQL CLR Backdoor on a Windows Post-Exploitation Staging Hostcmd_exec.dll: MSSQL CLR Backdoor (Assembly Structure) (YARA, Hunting); MSSQL CLR Backdoor: sqlservr.exe Spawning cmd.exe Child (SIGMA, Detection); IIS Webshell Execution: w3wp.exe Spawning cmd.exe or WScript (SIGMA, Detection)
Detection rules
Chaos Ransomware (TorBrowserTor) Multi-Stage Loader (94.103.1.13)Batch Dropper Structural Anchors (YARA, Detection)
Detection rules
Open Directory at 193.56.255.154 — XiebroC2 v3.1 & Covenant C2Shell Process Spawned from main.exe (XiebroC2 Implant Parent-Child Pattern) (SIGMA, Hunting)
Tracked actors
Designations whose reports map this technique.
- UTA-2026-002: XiebroC2 and Covenant operator working from a Chinese-language build environment
- UTA-2026-003: Commodity MaaS consumer running Shadow RAT and XWorm from one Windows VPS
- UTA-2026-004: Developer of the OpenStrike multi-implant C2 toolkit, with a cracked Cobalt Strike arsenal
- UTA-2026-005: Chaos ransomware builder user with a private five-stage crypter
- UTA-2026-007: HijackLoader customer running a 15-month multi-vector phishing campaign into an AsyncRAT-class RAT
- UTA-2026-020: Self-branded commodity cryptojacking operator mass-exploiting exposed Chinese enterprise software
- UTA-2026-021: Assembler-model intrusion operator staging other actors' tooling against one German victim forest
- UTA-2026-023: Telecom-focused operator reaching a carrier's credential plane through a customer's managed router
- UTA-2026-024: Windows post-exploitation intrusion set with Sliver and a blockchain-resolved implant
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