ATT&CK Technique · Stealth
T1027 Obfuscated Files or InformationMapped by 19 reports, 22 detection rules and 17 tracked actors on The Hunters Ledger. Technique page on attack.mitre.org.
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Reports
Each report maps this technique in its own ATT&CK table, at the confidence the report states. The link opens that table.
Detection rules
Rules whose ATT&CK coverage line names this technique, by detection page. The link opens the page's coverage table.
Detection rules
Sliver C2 Windows Post-Exploitation Staging, 193.233.202.17Reflective .NET Assembly Load From A Base64-Encoded PowerShell String (SIGMA, Hunting)
Detection rules
CloudSync: An Assembler's Intrusion Toolkitsvhost.js Fileless Loader: Custom Alphabet (YARA, Detection)
Detection rules
EvilSoul-Engine: A Brazilian Stealer-Builder Malware-as-a-ServiceEvilSoul-Engine Obfuscator XOR Key and Catchphrase (YARA, Detection); EvilSoul-Engine Split-Domain Anti-Grep Pattern (YARA, Hunting)
Detection rules
Multi-Actor AI-Agent Framework Abuse (8 Operators)libpam_cache LD_PRELOAD Rootkit Family Signature (YARA, Detection); Cryptojacker libpam_cache Drop to /lib/security (SIGMA, Detection)
Detection rules
Rovodev AI-Co-Authored Mirai Variant + Matrix C2 (87.106.143.220)MAL_ELF_Naku_Pandora_Mirai_Family (YARA, Detection); Naku/Pandora-Mirai Operator-Bespoke 22-Char Charset String: Family Tracking Signature (SIGMA, Hunting); Naku-Pandora Mirai Operator-Bespoke CNC Protocol (Length-Prefixed String Option Keys) (SURICATA, Hunting)
Detection rules
GHOST Cryptojacker Kit — Vova75Rus Supply Chain (77.110.96.200)Suspicious Shared Library Created in PAM Security Directory (SIGMA, Detection)
Detection rules
Rhadamanthys MaaS Customer Deep-Dive (79.137.192.3)Rhadamanthys .frontb Stage-2 Section Marker (YARA, Detection); Rhadamanthys Operator Loader Build/Campaign Strings (YARA, Detection); Rhadamanthys Customer-Specific Stage-2 CBC-XOR IV (YARA, Hunting)
Detection rules
HijackLoader / Penguish / Rugmi to AsyncRAT Multi-Vector Phishing CampaignExceptionHandler.dll Plowshare Dispatcher (YARA, Detection); pe_03 HijackLoader Stage-3 Loader (API Hash Table) (YARA, Detection)
Detection rules
Chaos Ransomware (TorBrowserTor) Multi-Stage Loader (94.103.1.13)Batch Dropper Structural Anchors (YARA, Detection); mymain Build In-Memory Crypter Keys (YARA, Hunting); myfile Build In-Memory Crypter Keys (YARA, Hunting)
Detection rules
Shadow RAT & XWorm Open Directory CampaignShadow RAT v2.6.4.0: AMSI + ETW Bypass Chain (YARA, Detection); XWorm 3.0-5.0: Config and Builder Markers (YARA, Detection); XWorm 3.0-5.0: Rijndael-256-ECB Config Crypto Pattern (YARA, Hunting)
Detection rules
Open Directory at 193.56.255.154 — XiebroC2 v3.1 & Covenant C2Covenant PowerShell Fileless Loader: GruntHTTP.ps1 (YARA, Detection)
Tracked actors
Designations whose reports map this technique.
- UTA-2026-002: XiebroC2 and Covenant operator working from a Chinese-language build environment
- UTA-2026-003: Commodity MaaS consumer running Shadow RAT and XWorm from one Windows VPS
- UTA-2026-004: Developer of the OpenStrike multi-implant C2 toolkit, with a cracked Cobalt Strike arsenal
- UTA-2026-005: Chaos ransomware builder user with a private five-stage crypter
- UTA-2026-006: Stock AdaptixC2 operator with an operator-written PowerShell and .NET injection chain
- UTA-2026-007: HijackLoader customer running a 15-month multi-vector phishing campaign into an AsyncRAT-class RAT
- UTA-2026-008: Developer and operator of the BellaMain Turkish phishing-as-a-service panel
- UTA-2026-009: Multi-product fraud operator pairing a real VPN service with a brand-impersonation phishing library
- UTA-2026-010: Rhadamanthys MaaS customer with a self-built loader (customer side only, never the vendor)
- UTA-2026-011: Financially motivated operator weaponising a cPanel authentication bypass with a custom harvesting toolkit
- UTA-2026-014: DDoS-for-hire operator running an AI co-authored C2 framework over a Pandora-Mirai botnet
- UTA-2026-016: GHOST cryptojacker kit customer (operator A) with self-hosted mining pool proxies
- UTA-2026-017: GHOST cryptojacker kit customer (operator B) using public mining pools, host abandoned
- UTA-2026-018: Hands-on-keyboard operator exploiting four Southeast Asian governments with a bespoke edge-device toolkit
- UTA-2026-021: Assembler-model intrusion operator staging other actors' tooling against one German victim forest
- UTA-2026-023: Telecom-focused operator reaching a carrier's credential plane through a customer's managed router
- UTA-2026-024: Windows post-exploitation intrusion set with Sliver and a blockchain-resolved implant
ATT&CK v19.2. MITRE ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation; technique names are MITRE's and link to MITRE's own pages. The mapping on each linked page is this publication's reading of its own evidence.